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Recent Developments 
Werbowsky v. Collomb: 
Futility Exception Remains Applicable but Only Where Irreparable Harm Caused 
by a Demand or Direct Conflict Precluding Good Faith is Clearly Demonstrated 
I n its first examination of the issue since 1968, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that the futility exception 
to the requirement that a 
demand be made upon directors 
as a prerequisite to instituting a 
derivative action is only 
applicable when the majority of 
directors in a corporation are so 
directly conflicted that they cannot 
be expected to operate within the 
confines of the business judgment 
rule, or if a demand or delay in 
receiving a response could cause 
irreparable harm to a corporation. 
Werbowsky v. Co/lomb, 362 
Md. 581,766 A.2d 123 (2001). 
The court concluded that directors 
who served on the boards ofboth 
the company and its controlling 
corporate shareholder were not 
so conflicted that they would 
respond adversely to a demand 
by minority stockholders to 
investigate whether a business 
transaction was in the best interest 
of the company. The court 
considered the alternatives to the 
futility exception proposed by 
other jurisdictions and 
organizations, but reiterated its 
support of the futility exception in 
limited application. 
Lafarge Corporation 
("Lafarge") is a corporation 
chartered in Maryland. Lafarge 
By Danielle C. Grilli 
S.A. ("LSA") is a French 
corporation that is the majority 
stockholder of Lafarge. LSA 
began planning an acquisition of 
the UK company Redland PLC. 
LSA asked Lafarge in 1996 if it 
was interested in any ofRedland's 
American or Canadian assets, 
which Lafarge declined. Bertrand 
Co 11omb ("Co 11omb") was serving 
as Chairman of the Board of 
Directors for both Lafarge and 
LSA and as CEO of LSA. After 
the start ofLSA's hostile takeover 
of Redland in October 1997, 
Collomb advised the Lafarge 
directors that upon successful 
takeover ofRedland, LSA would 
again offer them some of 
Redland 's Canadian and 
American assets. The board 
concluded that to consider LSA's 
offer, it would be necessary to 
assign a special committee of 
independent directors. 
Lafarge assigned five of its 
directors to the special committee 
and authorized them to review the 
proposal by LSA. The special 
committee then selected the firm 
ofWarburg Dillon Read ("Dillon 
Read"), as its investment banking 
advisor. Dillon Read 
recommended that Lafarge 
acquire several assets which LSA 
had acquired in the takeover of 
Redland, PLC. Members ofthe 
special committee met with 
Collomb and agreed to a price of 
$690 million. Subsequently, the 
committee approved the 
arrangement by adopting a 
resolution that Lafarge's board 
accepted the next day. The price 
was not to exceed $690 million. 
This suit was filed on March 
18, 1998, one day after the 
transaction was announced, with 
no prior contact or demand made 
upon Lafarge or its directors. The 
suit was initially brought by the 
owner of only twenty shares of 
Lafarge, a company which, since 
1994, had filed sixty-four other 
shareholder lawsuits against 
various corporations. The suit 
was filed well after the transaction 
in question had commenced. 
An amended complaint was 
filed asserting that Lafarge 
overpaid for the Redland assets 
by between $165 and $210 
million. The complaint also 
claimed that pre-suit demands 
upon the directors would have 
been futile since 1) the majority 
of the supposedly independent 
directors "actively participated in 
the wrongful conduct" that was 
the immediate result of their gross 
negligence in failing to recognize 
the potential harms of the deal 
with LSA; 2) the directors had an 
incentive to accommodate LSA 
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in order to maintain their 
positions in light of LSA' s 
control over Lafarge, and the 
directors were substantially 
compensated for their duties 
and 3) due to language in the 
liability insurance policies of 
both the directors and officers, 
the corporation would not be 
allowed to bring action against 
the directors. The defendants 
responded to the amended 
complaint with a motion to 
dismiss based , among other 
reasons, on plaintiff's failure to 
make demand on the directors 
for remedial action. The motion 
to dismiss was denied. 
The Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County noted the lack of 
Maryland law on this issue and 
relied heavily on a test articulated 
by Delaware law. In applying this 
test to the evidence presented, the 
circuit court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had failed to establish a 
reasonable doubt that the 
directors lacked independence 
and granted summary judgment for 
the defendants. 
The Court of Appeals began 
its analysis by stating that the 
nature of a derivative suit has two 
parts, "First, it is the equivalent of 
a suit by the shareholders to 
compel the corporation to sue. 
Second, it is [a] suit by the 
corporation, asserted by the 
shareholder on its behalf, against 
those liable to it." /d. at 600, 766 
A.2d at 133. The court then 
posited that due to the intrusive 
nature of a derivative suit on 
managerial authority, the law 
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attaches a prerequisite to filing 
this type of suit. /d. 
Interpreting Maryland law in 
Kamen v. Kemper, 500 U.S. 90, 
95-97 (1991), the Supreme 
Court enunciated that a 
Maryland pre-suit demand in a 
derivative action is a 
substantive requirement /d. at 
601, 766 A.2d 134. It is estab-
lished that courts will not hear a 
derivative action by a stockholder 
on behalf of a corporation until it 
is shown that all ofhis remedies 
are exhausted in the corporation 
and a demand upon the 
corporation to pursue the suit was 
denied or ignored. /d. at 602, 766 
A.2d at 135-36 (citing Parish v. 
Milk Producers Ass 'n, 250 Md. 
24, 81-82, 242 A.2d 512, 544 
( 1968)). The one exception to this 
rule is that demand is not required 
if it would be futile. 
Although it has been codified 
in a minority of jurisdictions, the 
futility exception remains primarily 
a creature of the common law in 
most jurisdictions, including 
Maryland. /d. at 602, 766 A.2d 
at 135. Because the court has not 
considered this issue since Parish 
in 1968, it reviewed both 
statutory and common law 
developments in other states since 
that decision. The court believed 
that the trend subsequent to 
Parish "has been to enforce more 
strictly the requirement of pre-suit 
demand and at least to 
circumscribe, if not effectively 
eliminate, the futility exception." 
/d. at607, 766A.2dat 137. The 
court next considered the 
Delaware test used by the lower 
court, but called it "an exacting 
requirement" and declined to 
follow it. /d. at *46-47, *61-62. 
The court discussed the "flat 
universal demand requirement" 
posited by the American Bar 
Association and the American 
Law Institute and contained in 
section 7.42 of the Model 
Business Corporation Act 
("Act"). /d. at 611, 766 A.2d at 
140. The Act provides that in 
order to commence a derivative 
suit, a shareholder must make a 
written demand upon the 
corporation "to take suitable 
action" and a ninety-day period 
must expire from the date the 
demand was made unless the 
shareholder has already been told 
that the demand was rejected by 
the corporation or irreparable 
injury to the corporation would 
result by waiting ninety days. /d. 
at 611-612, 766 A.2d 140. 
The court stated that 
although there "is much to be said 
for the ABA/ ALI approach" that 
calls for the elimination of the 
futility exception to the demand 
requirement, the court declined to 
make it a part of its common law 
because it represents a "radical 
departure from our current 
common law" and is a change that 
should be decided by legislative 
hearings. /d. at 617-618, 766 
A.2d 143. The court emphasized 
the importance of the demand 
requirement and noted that "pre-
suit demand is not an onerous 
requirement." /d. at 619, 766 
A.2d 144. 
The court held that, for 
now, it would continue to 
utilize the futility exception, but 
would follow the current trend 
of other jurisdictions and hold 
that it is a limited exception. /d. 
at 620, 766 A.2d at 144. In order 
to apply the futility exception, 
allegations or evidence must 
clearly establish "in a very 
particular manner" that either: 
( 1) a demand, or a delay in 
awaiting a response to a 
demand, would cause irreparable 
harm to the corporation, or (2) a 
majority of the directors are so 
personally and directly conflicted 
or committed to the decision in 
dispute that they cannot 
reasonably be expected to 
respond to a demand in good 
faith and within the ambit of the 
business judgment rule." /d. 
Plaintiffs raised two 
objections to the decision of the 
circuit court: first, that the court 
erred by deciding the futility issue 
on summary judgment after 
deciding that the amended 
complaint raised the issue 
adequately, and second, that the 
evidence, on a summary judgment 
standard, was sufficient to show 
futility. /d. at 620, 766 A.2d at 
144-45. The court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court and 
rejected both complaints stating 
that although the futility issue is 
often raised in a motion to 
dismiss, it is not required to be 
decided only at that point. /d. at 
620-21, 7 66 A.2d at 145. With 
regard to the futility issue, the 
court found that the plaintiffs had 
not produced sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the 
directors of Lafarge were 
conflicted or controlled by LSA 
so extensively that demand 
upon them would have been 
futile. 
The holding of the court of 
appeals is significant because it is 
the first time the court has ren-
dered an opinion on this issue 
in over thirty years. More 
importantly, although the court 
states that it is not changing the 
common law, this decision is a 
radical departure, in spirit if not 
in letter, from the court's more 
liberal treatment of the issue in 
Parish v. Milk Producers Ass 'n. 
With this decision, the court 
appears to have become hostile to 
the futility exception, and comes 
very close to eliminating it 
altogether. Given the strict nature 
of the newly formulated limitation, 
perhaps they have. 
Recent Developments 
31.2 U. Bait. L.F. 33 
